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Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?
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Abstract
Derivatives enjoy special status in bankruptcy: They are exempt from the automatic stay
and effectively senior to virtually all other claims. We propose a corporate finance model to
assess the effect of these exemptions on a firm’s cost of borrowing and its incentives to engage in
efficient derivative transactions. While derivatives are value-enhancing risk management tools,
seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies: It transfers credit risk to debtholders, even
though this risk is borne more efficiently in the derivative market. Seniority for derivatives
is efficient only if it provides sufficient cross-netting benefits to derivative counterparties that
provide hedging services.
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Derivative contracts enjoy special status under U.S. bankruptcy law: Derivative counterparties are
exempt from the automatic stay, and—through netting, closeout, and collateralization provisions—
they are generally able to immediately collect payment from a defaulted counterparty.1 Taken
together, these special provisions make derivative counterparties effectively senior to almost all
other claimants in bankruptcy. The costs and benefits of this special treatment are the subject
of a recent debate among legal scholars, policymakers, and regulators. Notably, this debate is
characterized by considerable disagreement about the costs and benefits of the special bankruptcy
treatment of derivatives, which is reflected in substantial differences in the bankruptcy treatment
of derivatives across different jurisdictions.2
In this paper we provide the first formal analysis of the economic consequences of the privileged
treatment of derivative contracts in bankruptcy. The fundamental observation underlying our anal-
ysis is that (effective) seniority for derivatives does not eliminate default risk—it transfers default
risk from derivative counterparties to other claimholders, particularly creditors. The desirability
of seniority for derivatives thus depends on whether default risk is more efficiently borne in the
derivative market or in the debt market.
To address this question we extend the standard incomplete contracts framework in corpo-
rate finance,3 in which debt contracts are insufficiently state-contingent, by introducing derivative
contracts that allow the firm to arrange state-contingent transfers with a separate derivative coun-
terparty. Specifically, derivatives allow for payments tied to publicly observable and verifiable events
that are correlated with the firm’s unobservable (or unverifiable) cash flow outcomes. Derivatives
are supplied by derivative counterparties that are themselves subject to a moral hazard problem,
which is mitigated by requiring the posting of costly collateral as in Biais, Heider, and Hoerova
(2012). Within this framework, we characterize the conditions under which the current privileged
bankruptcy treatment of derivatives is desirable (or undesirable).
Our baseline model considers a single firm that undertakes a positive NPV investment, which is
optimally financed with debt. Cash flow from operations is risky, so that the firm does not always
have sufficient funds to meet its debt obligations. As a result, the firm is exposed to default risk,
which gives rise to a demand for derivatives as hedging tools. By allowing for transfers of cash from
states of the world correlated with high-cash flow realizations to states correlated with low-cash
flow realizations, derivative contracts help reduce—possibly even eliminate—the risk of default and
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inefficient early liquidation.4
The main novelty of our analysis is that it considers how the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives
affects these hedging benefits. The conventional wisdom is that effective seniority for derivatives
lowers a firm’s cost of hedging and should thus be beneficial overall. We show that this argument
is at best incomplete. Although the privileged treatment of derivatives reduces counterparty risk
in derivative markets, it increases credit risk for the firm’s creditors, who now face larger losses in
default. In frictionless financial markets a` la Modigliani and Miller, this transfer of risk between
different claimants would have no effect on the firm’s overall cost of capital. In our incomplete
contracting framework, the priority ranking of debt relative to derivatives matters because it affects
endogenous contractual frictions in derivative and debt markets.
A net cost of providing hedging services arises endogenously in our framework because derivative
writers (counterparties) must post costly collateral to back up their promises. When a derivative
contract moves against the derivative writer, it must post collateral to prevent it from engaging
in risk-shifting actions that increase counterparty risk, as in Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2012).
This posting of collateral is costly because it means giving up other, more productive uses of the
counterparty’s capital. Thus, the priority ranking of derivatives relative to debt affects the net costs
of hedging services because it affects the amount of costly collateral that providers of derivatives
have to post.
Our analysis reveals that the impact of the priority ordering of derivatives on the overall dead-
weight costs of hedging depends on the interplay of three main effects. The first effect, which is
commonly stressed by practitioners, is that once the firm has issued its debt it is (ex post) optimal
to hedge default risk with a derivative that is senior to existing debt. That way, derivative writers
get maximum protection against default by the firm on its derivative obligations, thereby reducing
the stand-alone cost of the hedge.
Ex ante, however, the firm’s creditors anticipate the resulting subordination of their claims
to derivative counterparties, which leads to a second and countervailing effect: Creditors demand
higher promised repayments to compensate for the higher credit risk they face. The higher required
debt payments in turn increase the firm’s demand for hedging, so much so that the benefits of
seniority for derivatives are wiped out by the concomitantly higher collateral requirements for the
derivative counterparty. In addition, when derivatives are senior and hedging positions are entered
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only after debt has been issued, the firm may have an incentive to dilute existing debtholders by
over-hedging or by taking risky bets in derivative markets. Such ex post dilution is inefficient,
unless it is strictly required to induce the firm’s shareholders to undertake a value-increasing hedge
(i.e., a hedge that is beneficial to shareholders and debtholders combined).5,6
The third effect arises when we extend our firm-level analysis to a multi-firm setting. When
derivative counterparties deal with many firms, the cross-netting benefits to derivative writers from
being a senior claimant in bankruptcy can make seniority for derivatives efficient, even when there
is no gain from the special treatment of derivatives at the individual firm level. Specifically, when
defaults by firms that use derivatives as hedging tools are imperfectly correlated, payments that
senior derivative counterparties receive from defaulted firms can reduce their expected net liabilities
in bad states. This, in turn, reduces the amount of collateral that derivative writers are required
to post, which can reverse the benefits of junior derivatives at the firm level. Our analysis shows
that seniority for derivatives is the efficient arrangement only when such cross-netting benefits for
derivative writers are sufficiently large, which is the case when either cash flow risk or basis risk
are (mostly) idiosyncratic.
Finally, we investigate how the seniority treatment of derivatives affects the possibility that the
firm may default in high-cash flow states due to losses incurred on its derivative position. Our
analysis shows that this outcome is unambiguously more likely when derivatives are senior. First,
the combined debt and derivative repayments are larger when derivatives are senior, raising the
prospect that the firm may be unable to meet its obligations even in the high-cash flow state.
Second, under the current privileged bankruptcy treatment of derivatives, it may be in the coun-
terparty’s interest to make an inefficient collateral call that pushes the firm into bankruptcy. If the
firm could impose a stay on collateral demands by derivative counterparties, it would be protected
against such inefficient collateral calls (or runs on collateral).
To the extent that the favorable bankruptcy treatment of derivatives can lead to inefficiencies,
a relevant question is whether firms can contractually “undo the law” in such cases. For example,
firms may want to commit not to collateralize derivative contracts, thus stripping them of their
effective seniority. However, debt covenants prohibiting the collateralization of derivatives are likely
to be difficult to draft and costly to enforce (see Ayotte and Bolton (2011)). Enforcement constraints
are likely to be especially severe for financial institutions: While it may be possible to shield physical
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collateral from derivative counterparties (for example, by granting collateral protection over plant
and equipment to secured creditors), it is generally harder to shield unassigned cash from collateral
calls by derivative counterparties in situations when a financial institution approaches financial
distress. By the very nature of their business, financial institutions cannot assign cash as collateral
to all depositors and creditors, because this would, in effect, erase their value added as financial
intermediaries.
A number of legal scholars have taken up the question of the costs and benefits of the privileged
treatment of derivatives (and, more generally, “qualified financial contracts”) in bankruptcy.7 We
contribute to this debate by offering the first formal ex ante and ex post analysis of this issue.8
A set of related studies on optimal corporate risk management (most notably those by Rampini
and Viswanathan (2010, 2013) and Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014)) also relies on models
of state-contingent contracting subject to collateral constraints. However, in these models all
financial contracts are fully collateralized, so that there is no default in equilibrium. In addition,
these models allow the lender to bundle financing and risk management in a single state-contingent
contract, which means that they are not well suited to studying the priority ranking of debt and
derivatives in bankruptcy. In contrast, our working assumption, which is in line with the incomplete
contracting literature, is that debt contracts cannot be written in an optimally state contingent
form from the outset (whether directly or by bundling debt with a derivative contract), so that firms
enter hedging transactions that appear suitable over time by using separate derivative contracts.9
Finally, the dilution of debt contracts through senior derivatives is related to other forms of debt
dilution that have been discussed in the corporate finance literature, whether through risk shifting
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)), via the issuance of additional senior or short-term debt (Fama and
Miller (1972), Diamond (1993a,b), and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)), or by granting security
interests to certain creditors (Bebchuk and Fried (1996)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I briefly summarizes the special
status of derivative securities under U.S. bankruptcy law. Section II introduces the model. Section
III analyzes a benchmark case without derivatives. Section IV discusses the effect of the bankruptcy
treatment of derivatives in the case where the derivative has no basis risk. Section V extends the
analysis to allow for basis risk and presents the main findings of our analysis. Section VI shows that,
in a multi-firm setting, cross-netting benefits for counterparties can make seniority for derivatives
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efficient. Section VII discusses the effects of the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives on the firm’s
hedging incentives and on the incidence of strategic default. Section VIII offers some concluding
remarks.
I. The Special Bankruptcy Status of Derivatives
In this section we briefly summarize the special status of derivatives in bankruptcy and explain
why derivatives are often referred so as “super senior” claims.10 Strictly speaking, derivatives
are not senior in the formal legal sense.11 However, derivative, swap, and repo counterparties
enjoy certain rights that set them apart from regular creditors. While not formally senior, these
rights make derivatives effectively senior to regular creditors, at least to the extent that they are
collateralized.
The most important advantages a derivative, swap, or repo counterparty has relative to a reg-
ular creditor pertain to closeout, collateralization, netting, and the treatment of eve-of-bankruptcy
payments, eve-of-bankruptcy collateral calls, and fraudulent conveyances. First, upon default,
derivative counterparties have the right to terminate their contract with the firm and collect pay-
ment by seizing and selling collateral posted to them. This differs from regular creditors, who
cannot collect payments when the firm defaults, because, unlike derivative counterparties, their
claims are subject to the automatic stay. In fact, even if they are collateralized, regular credi-
tors are not allowed to seize and sell collateral upon default, since their collateral, in contrast to
the collateral posted to derivative counterparties, is subject to the automatic stay. Hence, to the
extent that a derivative counterparty is collateralized at the time of default, collateralization and
closeout provisions imply that the derivative counterparty is de facto senior to essentially all other
claimants.12
Second, when closing out their positions with the bankrupt firm, derivative counterparties
have stronger netting privileges than regular creditors. Because they can net offsetting positions,
derivative counterparties may be able to prevent making payments to a bankrupt firm that a regular
debtor would have to make, thereby strengthening the position of derivative counterparties vis-a`-vis
regular creditors in bankruptcy.13
Finally, derivative counterparties have stronger rights regarding eve-of-bankruptcy payments
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or fraudulent conveyances. For example, while regular creditors often have to return payments
made or collateral posted to them within 90 days before bankruptcy, derivative counterparties are
not subject to those rules. Any collateral posted to a derivative counterparty at the time of a
bankruptcy filing is for the derivative counterparty to keep.
These factors taken together, the special bankruptcy treatment puts derivative counterparties
in a much stronger position than regular creditors: To the extent that derivative contracts are col-
lateralized, they are effectively senior to almost all other claims. In practice, this collateralization
is usually ensured via regular marking-to-market and collateral calls. While for most of the remain-
der of the paper we will somewhat loosely refer to derivatives as being senior to debt, this should
be interpreted in the light of the special rights and effective priority of derivative counterparties
discussed in this section.
II. Model Setup
A. The Firm
We consider a firm that can undertake a two-period investment project. This firm can be
interpreted as a nonfinancial firm undertaking a real investment project or as a financial institution
investing in a risky loan or loan portfolio. The investment requires an initial outlay F at date 0
and generates cash flow at dates 1 and 2. At date 1, the project generates high cash flow CH1 with
probability θ and low cash flow CL1 < C
H
1 with probability 1− θ. At date 2, the project generates
(expected) cash flow C2. Following the realization of the first-period cash flow, the project can be
liquidated for a liquidation value L. We assume that 0 ≤ L < C2, implying that early liquidation is
inefficient. For simplicity (but without loss of generality), we normalize the firm’s date 1 liquidation
value to L = 0. After the realization of C2, the firm is liquidated for a date 2 value of zero.
The firm has no initial funds and finances the project by issuing debt. The debt contract
specifies the following terms: (i) the firm is to make a contractual repayment R at date 1; (ii) if
the firm makes this contractual payment, it has the right to continue the project and collect the
date 2 cash flow; (iii) if the firm fails to make the contractual date 1 payment R, the creditor
has the right to discontinue the project and liquidate the firm. Liquidation can be interpreted as
either an outright liquidation under a Chapter 7 cash auction, or a Chapter 11 reorganization. In
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the latter interpretation, L denotes the expected payment the creditor receives in a Chapter 11
reorganization. Both the firm and the creditor are risk neutral. The creditor has a cost of funds of
1, and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero.14
In financing the project, the firm faces a limited pledgeability problem similar to that in Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990, 1996) and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998). More specifically, we assume that
only the minimum date 1 cash flow CL1 is verifiable and that all other cash flows can potentially
be diverted by the borrower. This means concretely that, even if the high cash flow CH1 obtains at
date 1, the firm can claim to have obtained only the low cash flow and pay out CL1 instead of R.
We also assume that none of the date 2 cash flow can be committed to the lender. Finally, to make
financing choices non trivial, we assume that CL1 < F , such that the project cannot be financed
with risk-free debt.
B. The Derivative Counterparty
Next, we introduce derivative contracts into the analysis. As with debt contracts, we do this in
the simplest possible way. Formally, a derivative contract specifies a payoff that is contingent on
the realization of a verifiable random variable Z ∈ {ZH , ZL}. This variable Z could, for example,
be a financial index that is observable to both contracting parties and is verifiable by a court.15
A derivative contract of a notional amount X is a promise by the derivative counterparty
(described in more detail below) to pay X to the firm if Z = ZL, against a payment x that is
payable from the firm to the derivative counterparty when Z = ZH .16 For simplicity, we assume
that ZL is realized with the same probability as the low cash flow CL1 (i.e., Pr
(
Z = ZL
)
= 1− θ).
Hence, a long position in the derivative pays off with the same unconditional probability with which
the firm receives the low cash flow CL1 . The derivative’s usefulness in hedging is then determined
by the correlation of the derivative payoff with the realization of the low cash flow. We capture
this correlation with the parameter γ. Specifically, we assume that ZL is realized conditional on
C1 = C
L
1 with probability γ:
Pr
(
Z = ZL|C1 = CL1
)
= γ. (1)
A derivative position of size X = R − CL1 therefore eliminates default in the low-cash flow state
with probability γ.17 If γ = 1 the derivative is a perfect hedge for the low-cash flow state. When
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γ < 1, on the other hand, the derivative has basis risk and only imperfectly hedges the low-cash
flow state and sometimes pays off in the high-cash flow state instead.18
When the firm enters a derivative position, the other side of the contract is taken by a derivative
counterparty that is distinct from the original lender. This counterparty could be a financial
institution, an insurance company, or a hedge fund providing hedging services to the firm. Generally,
the provision of this type of insurance is not free of costs for the derivative counterparty. In
particular, when faced with a notional exposure of X, the counterparty may face deadweight costs
if it has to post collateral or set aside capital to fulfill capital requirements. We model these costs
by building on the framework of Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2012). The derivative counterparty
has assets A on its balance sheet, which it can optimally invest for a gross return of 1, such that
the counterparty has the same opportunity cost of funds as the creditor. However, when the
counterparty enters into a derivative contract, it may have to post collateral in a margin account.
This collateral account earns a return Γ < 1 that is strictly less than the counterparty’s cost of
funds. The margin requirement therefore induces a deadweight cost.
The derivative counterparty may be required to post collateral because of a moral hazard
problem. Specifically, the derivative counterparty can take an unobserved action a ∈ {0, 1} that
alters the riskiness of its assets. When the counterparty chooses a = 1 (which can be interpreted
as prudent risk management), the gross return on its assets is deterministic and given by 1. When
the counterparty chooses a = 0 (which can be interpreted as shirking on risk management), the
return on its assets is risky and equal to 1 only with probability p < 1. With probability 1− p the
gross return is equal to zero. However, choosing a = 0 generates a private benefit b (per unit of
assets) to the counterparty. We assume that it is efficient for the counterparty to choose prudent
risk management (a = 1):
1 > p+ b. (2)
However, when liabilities on existing derivative contracts build up, the counterparty may prefer
to shirk and choose a = 0. In particular, suppose that, before choosing the action a, the counter-
party and the firm learn more information about the odds they face on their derivative contract
(X,x). For simplicity, assume they observe a signal s ∈ {sL, sH} that is perfectly correlated with
Z. When s = sH , incentives are aligned. If the counterparty chooses a = 1, its payoff is given by
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A + x, which is strictly higher than the payoff the counterparty would receive if it chose a = 0,
A(p + b) + x. However, incentives may not be aligned when s = sL. If the counterparty chooses
a = 1, it now receives A − X, which may be lower than the payoff the counterparty receives if
it chooses a = 0, p(A − X) + Ab. It is therefore optimal for the counterparty to shirk on risk
management whenever
b >
(1− p)(A−X)
A
. (3)
When condition (3) holds, preserving the counterparty’s incentives requires that the counter-
party post an amount ζ of its assets as collateral in a margin account, such that the counterparty’s
incentive constraint is satisfied:
ζΓ + (A− ζ)−X ≥ p [ζΓ + (A− ζ)−X] + (A− ζ)b. (4)
The minimum amount ζ that needs to be posted as collateral is then given by
ζ =
X −AP
Γ− P , (5)
where we defined
P ≡ 1− b
1− p, (6)
which can be interpreted as the counterparty’s pledgeable income per unit of assets (unit pledgeable
income).19
Derivatives have economic value in our setting. In particular, the derivative can be used to
decrease the variability of the firm’s cash flow at date 1, thereby effectively raising the verifiable
cash flow the firm has available. From a welfare perspective this is beneficial because, by raising
the low date 1 cash flow, the derivative allows the firm to reduce the probability of default at date
1. Hence, in the presence of derivatives as hedging instruments, the date 2 cash flow C2 is lost less
often. At the same time, collateral requirements for the counterparty create a deadweight cost of
1−Γ per unit of collateral posted. The counterparty has to post collateral ζ with probability 1−θ,
9
such that, in expectation, it incurs a deadweight cost of (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζ. Using (5) and defining
δ ≡ (1− θ)(1− Γ)
Γ− P , (7)
we can rewrite the expected deadweight cost of collateral as δ(X − AP), which shows that the
derivative counterparty faces linear deadweight costs for each dollar that the derivative obligation
X exceeds the pledgeable part of its balance sheet.20 In a competitive derivative market, these costs
are passed on to the firm. Overall, derivatives increase surplus whenever the gains from reducing
date 1 bankruptcy costs outweigh the deadweight cost of using derivatives.21
C. Seniority Treatment of Debt and Derivatives
We model the seniority of derivatives by first considering two extreme cases: first the case where
derivatives are senior to debt and then the alternative extreme case in which derivatives are junior.
The former situation is one where the required payment to the counterparty x is fully collateralized,
and where cash collateral in the amount of x can be seized by the derivative counterparty in the
event of a default on debt payments.22 In the other extreme case, when derivatives are junior
to debt, the payment x to the counterparty is not collateralized. Moreover, in this case the debt
contract also specifies that it is senior to the derivative claim in bankruptcy. After exploring these
polar cases, we will also consider the more general, intermediate case in which derivatives can be
partially collateralized by assigning limited collateral x ≤ x to the derivative counterparty. In
this case, only the amount x can be seized by the derivative writer in the event of default. The
remaining amount the firm owes to the derivative counterparty, x− x, is then treated as a regular
debt claim in bankruptcy. For simplicity we will assume that this remainder is junior to the claims
of the debtholder.23
The treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy affects the pricing of the derivative (the payment x
promised by the firm when Z = ZH) in the following way: In the event that period 1 cash flow is CL1
and that Z = ZH , the firm is unable to meet all its financial obligations—it owes R to its creditor
and x to the derivative counterparty, but R + x > CL1 . The priority of debt relative to derivatives
therefore affects the size of the payments the derivative counterparty and the lender can expect in
this state of the world. We assume that when the derivative is senior to debt, the counterparty
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is guaranteed to receive x in the event that Z = ZH (i.e., we assume that x ≤ CL1 ).24 If, on the
other hand, the derivative is junior to debt, then the counterparty will not receive any payment
when Z = ZH and C1 = C
L
1 since the creditor seizes all assets. This happens with probability
(1− θ)(1− γ).
To clearly distinguish senior and junior contracts, in what follows we will denote the pricing
terms of senior contracts by a superscript S and those of junior contracts by a superscript J .25
When the derivative is senior to debt, the payment from the firm in the event that Z = ZH is the
sure payment xS , and the break-even condition for the counterparty is
θxS − (1− θ)XS − (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζS = 0. (8)
The term (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζS reflects the expected deadweight cost of collateral that the counterparty
is required to post when the derivative is senior.26
In comparison, when the derivative is junior to debt and Z = ZH , the counterparty is paid only
if the firm receives a high cash flow CH1 . Hence, the counterparty receives x
J only with probability
θ − (1− θ) (1− γ). The break-even condition for the derivative counterparty is then given by
[θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xJ − (1− θ)XJ − (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζJ = 0, (9)
where
ζJ =
XJ −AP
Γ− P . (10)
Comparing (5) and (10) shows that the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives affects required col-
lateral and hence the counterparty’s deadweight cost of providing insurance to the firm.
D. Timing of Moves
Implicit in our description of the model so far is the following assumption on the timing of
moves. The firm enters the derivative contract after it has signed the debt contract with the
creditor. Moreover, at the initial contracting stage, the firm and the creditor cannot condition the
debt contract on a particular realization of Z. This assumption reflects the idea that at the ex ante
contracting stage it may not be known which business risks the firm needs to or can hedge in the
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future and which derivative positions will be required to do so. Essentially, this assumption is in
line with the literature on incomplete contracting and rules out a fully state-contingent contract at
date 0 between the creditor and the firm that bundles financing and hedging.27
III. Benchmark: No Derivatives
We first describe the equilibrium in the absence of a derivative market. The results from this
section provide a benchmark against which we can evaluate the effects of introducing derivative
markets.
In the absence of derivatives, the firm always defaults if the low cash flow CL1 realizes at date 1.
Because CL1 < F , the low cash flow is not sufficient to repay the face value of debt. Moreover, the
date 2 cash flow C2 is not pledgeable and, since the firm has no other cash it can offer to renegotiate
with the creditor, it has no other option than to default when CL1 is realized at date 1. The lender
then seizes the cash flow CL1 and shuts down the firm, collecting the liquidation value of the asset
L. Early termination of the project leads to a social loss of C2 − L, the additional cash flow that
would have been generated had the firm been allowed to continue its operations.
If the high cash flow CH1 realizes at date 1, the firm has enough cash to service its debt. However,
the firm may nonetheless choose to default strategically. A strategic default occurs when the firm
is better off defaulting on its debt at date 1 than repaying the debt and continuing operations until
date 2, which is the case when the continuation value C2 is sufficiently low. For most of our analysis
we will assume that C2 is high enough, such that the firm services its debt in the high state. We
return to the issue of strategic default in Section VII.B.
Assuming that the firm repays its debt obligation in the high-cash flow state, the lender’s break-
even constraint (given competitive capital markets and the simplifying assumption that L = 0) is
given by
θR+ (1− θ)CL1 = F. (11)
Given the break-even condition (11), we can then summarize the credit market outcome in the
absence of derivatives as follows.
PROPOSITION 1: In the absence of derivative markets and assuming that C2 is sufficiently high
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that no strategic default occurs in the high-cash flow state, the equilibrium face value of debt is given
by R =
[
F − (1− θ)CL1
]
/θ. The firm is shut down after the low-cash flow realization, and social
surplus is equal to θ
(
CH1 + C2
)
+ (1− θ)CL1 − F.
For the purpose of our analysis, the most important implication of Proposition 1 is that, in the
absence of derivatives, the firm is always shut down if the low cash flow realizes at date 1. Such
early termination leads to an inefficiency because the continuation value C2 is lost. As we will show
in the following section, derivatives can reduce this inefficiency by reducing the risk of default at
date 1.
IV. Financing with Derivatives: No Basis Risk
In this section (and in Sections V and VI), we consider the firm’s problem of optimal hedging
when it can commit to selecting the ex ante optimal derivative contract. For a benchmark, we
consider first the case where the derivative has no basis risk. This corresponds to the situation
where γ = 1. When there is no basis risk, the firm can completely eliminate default risk by choosing
an appropriate position in the derivative. As we will see, in this benchmark case, a firm that can
commit to its derivative position always takes the socially optimal hedging position, and the priority
ordering of the derivative relative to debt is irrelevant.
A firm that can commit to its derivative position always chooses the derivative position that
maximizes the overall surplus: Both the creditor and the derivative counterparty just break even,
and all remaining surplus is captured by the firm. The firm will thus choose to hedge whenever it
is socially optimal to do so. Moreover, because the derivative is costly, when hedging is optimal the
firm will always take the minimum position in the derivative that is needed to eliminate default.
In this case, the priority ranking of debt relative to the derivative is irrelevant: Whenever the firm
chooses to hedge, debt becomes risk free and default will never occur. But when there is never any
default, the bankruptcy treatment of debt relative to derivatives does not matter.
We can see this more formally by comparing the costs and benefits from hedging in either
regime. Eliminating default leads to a gain of (1− θ)C2, since now the firm can be kept alive even
after the realization of CL1 at date 1. The net cost of eliminating default is given by the deadweight
cost that needs to be incurred in derivative markets. Since the derivative completely eliminates
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default when there is no basis risk, debt becomes safe, so that R = F , irrespective of the priority
ranking of debt relative to derivatives. Hence, the deadweight cost of taking the required derivative
position X = F − CL1 is given by
(1− θ) (1− Γ) ζ, (12)
where
ζ =
F − CL1 −AP
Γ− P (13)
does not depend on the bankruptcy regime (hence no superscript). The firm chooses to hedge
whenever the presence of derivatives raises surplus, which is the case when
(1− θ)C2 − (1− θ) (1− Γ)
(
F − CL1 −AP
Γ− P
)
> 0, (14)
or, inserting (7),
(1− θ)C2 − δ(F − CL1 −AP) > 0. (15)
Hence, the hedging cost is linear in F − CL1 − AP, the difference in the counterparty’s exposure
F −CL1 and its total pledgeable income AP. Condition (15) is satisfied whenever the continuation
value of the firm C2 is sufficiently large, or when the cost of hedging is sufficiently low (which is
the case when the pledgeable income AP is sufficiently high).
PROPOSITION 2: When the derivative has no basis risk (γ = 1) and the firm can commit to a
derivative position it takes ex post:
1. The firm chooses the socially optimal derivative position.
2. The bankruptcy treatment of derivatives is irrelevant.
3. Hedging with derivatives raises surplus whenever
(1− θ)C2 − (1− θ) (1− Γ)
(
F − CL1 −AP
Γ− P
)
> 0. (16)
V. Financing with Derivatives: Basis Risk
We now consider the case where the derivative contract has basis risk (γ < 1). We begin
by establishing a lemma about collateralization of the derivative position stating that, once the
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face value of debt is set, it is always optimal ex post to maximally collateralize the derivative
contract when there is basis risk. The reason is that, once R is fixed, collateralization of the
derivative contract makes hedging cheaper for the firm. Thus, suppose that the firm can choose to
only partially collateralize derivatives by assigning only limited collateral x ≤ x to the derivative
counterparty, such that only the amount x can be seized by the counterparty in the event of default.
The remaining amount that the firm owes to the counterparty, x − x, is treated as a regular debt
claim in bankruptcy. For simplicity, assume that this remainder is junior to the claims of the
debtholder. Then the following lemma obtains.
LEMMA 1: Once financing has been secured and the face value of debt R has been set, it is privately
optimal for the firm and the derivative counterparty to fully collateralize the derivative position.
This is because the cost of the derivative x (x) is decreasing in the level of collateralization:
∂x (x)
∂x
< 0. (17)
Lemma 1 illustrates the conventional wisdom supporting the collateralization and effective se-
niority of derivatives: Collateralization and seniority for derivatives make hedging cheaper, which
benefits the firm. According to this logic, it is often argued that full collateralization and the
concomitant seniority of derivative contracts are optimal and that, conversely, reducing collateral-
ization or making derivative contracts junior to debt is undesirable because it raises the cost of the
derivative and thereby makes hedging more expensive for the firm.
However, changing the level of collateralization and hence the effective seniority of derivatives
while holding the face value of debt constant is not the correct thought experiment. After all, in
the event of default, debtholders and derivative counterparties hold claims on the same pool of
assets. Accordingly, changing the effective seniority of derivatives must, in equilibrium, also have
an impact on the pricing of the firm’s debt. As we show below, once we allow the pricing of the
firm’s debt to adjust in response to the effective seniority of derivative contracts, the argument for
full collateralization and effective seniority for derivatives is reversed. We show this by contrasting
the two polar cases of senior derivatives and junior derivatives. These two cases contain essentially
all the economic intuition for why, at the firm level, an arrangement where derivatives are junior
is more efficient. One can easily extend the analysis to the intermediate case, in which derivatives
15
can be partially collateralized.28
A. Seniority of Derivatives over Debt
As discussed in Section I, under the current special bankruptcy treatment, derivatives are
effectively senior to debt claims. When derivatives are senior, the counterparty is guaranteed to
receive the contractual payment xS that is due when Z = ZH (as long as xS ≤ CL1 ).29 For
the counterparty to break even, the expected payments received, θxS , must equal the expected
payments made, (1− θ)XS , plus the expected deadweight cost of hedging, (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζS , which
yields
θxS = (1− θ) [XS + (1− Γ) ζS ], (18)
where
ζS =
XS −AP
Γ− P . (19)
Substituting for ζS in (18) and rearranging, we obtain the following expression for the counterparty’s
break-even constraint:
θxS = (1− θ)XS + δ(XS −AP), (20)
where, as before, we define
δ ≡ (1− θ)(1− Γ)
Γ− P . (21)
The face value of junior debt, RJ , in turn, is determined by the creditor’s break-even condition.
When derivatives are senior to debt and xS ≤ CL1 , this break-even condition is given by
[θ + (1− θ) γ]RJ + (1− θ) (1− γ) (CL1 − xS) = F, (22)
which simply states that the expected payments received by the creditor must equal the initial
outlay F . Note that the seniority of the derivative contract becomes relevant in the state when
C1 = C
L
1 and Z = Z
H , which occurs with probability (1− θ) (1− γ). In that case, the derivative
counterparty is paid its contractual obligation xS before the creditor can receive any payment.
When γ < 1 the derivative is only a partial hedge, because it sometimes does not pay off when
C1 = C
L
1 and sometimes pays off when C1 = C
H
1 . Nevertheless, hedging can still be valuable for
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the firm because it reduces the probability of default. The optimal derivative position for the firm
(when it can commit to its hedging policy) is the one that just eliminates default when C1 = C
L
1
and the derivative pays off. Default can then be avoided with any derivative position that satisfies
XS ≥ RJ − CL1 . (23)
Thus, by setting XS = RJ −CL1 the derivative contract eliminates default in states when C1 = CL1
and Z = ZL (i.e., with probability (1− θ) γ). Increasing the derivative position beyond this level
does not generate any additional surplus; it only increases the deadweight hedging cost and is thus
inefficient. Because the derivative is an imperfect hedge, the firm defaults when C1 = C
L
1 and
Z = ZH (i.e., with probability (1− θ) (1− γ)).
Substituting the expression for xS from (20) into the creditor’s break-even condition (22) and
setting XS = RJ − CL1 , we obtain the following expression for the face value of debt:
[θ + (1− θ) γ]RJ + (1− θ) (1− γ)
[
CL1 −
(1− θ) (RJ − CL1 )+ δ(RJ − CL1 −AP)
θ
]
= F. (24)
Solving (24) for RJ , we then obtain the following characterization of the equilibrium when
derivatives are senior to debt.
PROPOSITION 3: Senior derivatives. Assume that derivatives are senior and that xS ≤ CL1 .
Under full commitment with respect to hedging policy, the optimal derivative position is given by
XS = RJ − CL1 . (25)
This leads to an equilibrium face value of debt
RJ =
θF − (1− θ) (1− γ) (1− δ)CL1 − δ (1− θ) (1− γ)AP
θ − (1 + δ) (1− θ) (1− γ) (26)
and a price of the derivative of
xS =
(1− θ + δ) (F − CL1 )− δ (θ + (1− θ) γ)AP
θ − (1 + δ) (1− θ) (1− γ) . (27)
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To gain intuition about Proposition 3, it is useful to recall the special case in which derivatives
provide a perfect hedge against cash flow risk at date 1 (γ = 1). In this case, debt becomes risk free
(RJ = F ) so that the optimal derivative position is given by XS = F − CL1 . When the derivative
is not a perfect hedge (γ < 1 ), on the other hand, debt is risky even in the presence of derivatives
(RJ > F ) and the required derivative position increases to RJ − CL1 > F − CL1 .
The social surplus generated in the presence of derivatives depends on how effective derivatives
are at hedging the firm’s cash flow risk. When the derivative has more basis risk (lower γ), it is less
effective as a hedging tool, such that the probability of continuation of the firm at date 1, which
is given by θ + (1− θ) γ, is lower. Moreover, higher basis risk increases the deadweight costs of
hedging because the required derivative position, RJ − CL1 , is larger.
COROLLARY 1: Social surplus under senior derivatives. Under senior derivatives, when
the firm chooses a derivative position of XS = RJ − CL1 , social surplus is given by
θCH1 + (1− θ)CL1 + [θ + (1− θ) γ]C2 − F − (1− θ)(1− Γ)ζS . (28)
Derivatives raise social surplus when the gain from the greater likelihood of continuation outweighs
the deadweight cost of hedging:
(1− θ) γC2 − (1− θ)(1− Γ)ζS > 0. (29)
Given that the amount ζS that the counterparty has to post as collateral is decreasing in the
counterparty’s unit pledgeable income P, derivatives are more likely to raise overall surplus when
the counterparty is well capitalized and therefore has to post less (or no) costly collateral.
B. Derivatives Junior to Debt
We now consider the opposite case, in which derivatives are junior to debt. As before, the
firm defaults at date 1 when it obtains a low cash flow CL1 and Z = Z
H . This happens with
probability (1− γ) (1− θ). When derivatives are junior, the lender now receives the entire cash
flow CL1 while the counterparty receives nothing. Of course, the greater default risk that the
derivative counterparty is now exposed to is passed on to the firm in the form of a higher cost of
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insurance xJ . The counterparty’s break-even constraint is then given by
xJ [θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)] = (1− θ) [XJ + (1− Γ) ζJ] , (30)
where
ζJ =
RS − CL1 −AP
Γ− P . (31)
Note that because the counterparty only receives the promised payment xJ with probability θ −
(1− θ) (1− γ), rather than with probability θ, it requires a higher promised payment, other things
equal. The senior creditor, on the other hand, now receives the entire cash flow in the default state,
so that its break-even constraint becomes
[θ + (1− θ) γ]RS + (1− θ) (1− γ)CL1 = F. (32)
Given the less risky debt claim, the promised face value of debt required to raise F is lower and
given by
RS =
F − (1− θ) (1− γ)CL1
θ + (1− θ) γ . (33)
As before, the optimal derivative position is such that XJ = RS − CL1 , and default occurs only
when C1 = C
L
1 and Z = Z
H (i.e., with probability (1− θ) (1− γ)). Using (30) and (33), we can
then characterize the equilibrium under junior derivatives as follows.
PROPOSITION 4: Junior derivatives. Assume that derivatives are junior and that xJ ≤ CL1 .
Under full commitment with respect to hedging policy, the optimal derivative position is given by
XJ = RS − CL1 . (34)
This leads to an equilibrium face value of debt
RS =
F − (1− θ) (1− γ)CL1
θ + γ (1− θ) (35)
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and price of the derivative of
xJ =
(1− θ + δ) [F − CL1 ]− δ [θ + γ (1− θ)]AP
[θ − (1− γ) (1− θ)] [θ + γ (1− θ)] . (36)
As with Proposition 3, we can use the results from Proposition 4 to obtain an expression for
the net social surplus when derivatives are junior.
COROLLARY 2: Social surplus under junior derivatives. Under junior derivatives, when
the firm chooses a derivative position of XJ = RS − CL1 , social surplus is given by
θCH + (1− θ)CL1 + [θ + (1− θ) γ]C2 − F − (1− θ)(1− Γ)ζJ . (37)
Derivatives raise social surplus when the gain from the greater likelihood of continuation outweighs
the deadweight cost of hedging:
(1− θ) γC2 − (1− θ)(1− Γ)ζJ > 0. (38)
As before, the required collateral ζJ that the counterparty must post is decreasing in the
counterparty’s unit pledgeable income P, so that condition (38) is more likely to be satisfied when
the counterparty is well capitalized.
From the expressions for RJ and RS in Propositions 3 and 4, it is immediate that RJ ≥ RS
and therefore that ζS ≥ ζJ . Indeed, from (19) and (31), we see that ζS and ζJ differ only in the
face values of the derivative liabilities for the counterparty XS = RJ −CL1 and XJ = RS −CL1 . It
follows immediately that the net social surplus under senior debt and junior derivatives in Corollary
2 is higher than the net social surplus under junior debt and senior derivatives in Corollary 1. This
is the key economic observation emerging from our analysis: When debt is senior, the sum of the
equilibrium cost of debt and the hedging contract is lower than when derivatives are senior. We
summarize this result in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: Comparing surplus under junior and senior derivatives. Relative to
the situation without derivatives, hedging with junior derivatives raises surplus more than hedging
with senior derivatives.
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Thus, the received wisdom that the seniority of derivatives is desirable (Lemma 1) reverses
once one takes into account the transfer of risk from the derivative counterparty to creditors: Net
social surplus is strictly higher under junior derivatives than under senior derivatives, except in
two special cases. First, when the derivative is a perfect hedge (γ = 1) so that the firm never
defaults, RS = RJ , and seniority of the derivative contract is irrelevant. Second, when there is
no deadweight hedging cost of hedging (ζS = ζJ = 0), seniority is also irrelevant, as a result of a
Modigliani-Miller type logic: Risk is transferred from debt markets to derivative markets, but net
surplus remains unchanged.
VI. Multiple Borrowers and the Benefits of Cross-Netting
So far we have analyzed the economic effects of the privileged bankruptcy treatment of deriva-
tives in the context of a single firm and a single counterparty. In this section, we reconsider the
effects in a multiple-borrower context, in which derivative counterparties enter derivative contracts
with many firms. The purpose of this analysis is to explore whether the senior treatment of deriva-
tives may be efficient once diversification benefits from cross-netting by derivative counterparties
are taken into account. To answer this question, we characterize how counterparties’ balance sheets
are affected by the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives when counterparties provide hedging ser-
vices to multiple firms. We then ask how the change in balance sheet risk affects the counterparties’
deadweight cost of providing insurance to firms.
We consider the market-wide effects of a change in the bankruptcy status of derivatives by
analyzing the equilibrium interaction between a representative derivative counterparty that enters
derivative contracts with many different representative firms. Formally, we consider a continuum
of identical firms (with unit mass), each faced with the same setup cost F , identical potential
cash flow realizations {CL1 , CH1 } in period 1, and identical continuation values C2. All firms are
funded using the same debt contract and hedge their cash flow risk by entering a derivative con-
tract with the representative derivative counterparty. The counterparty is subject to a free-entry
zero-profit condition. The main difference to the preceding analysis is that the representative coun-
terparty’s balance sheet is now composed of its initial endowment of assets A and a continuum
of derivative contracts (X,x), rather than a single derivative contract. While this is a stylized
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model of a derivative market—in practice, there is likely considerable heterogeneity across firms
and counterparties—it has the virtue of simplicity and allows us to focus on the core issue: the
potential cross-netting benefits to counterparties from being senior to creditors in bankruptcy.
Our analysis shows that the main determinant of the cross-netting benefits that derivative
writers gain from seniority is the correlation structure of the shocks to which firms are exposed.
Specifically, cross-netting benefits arise only if seniority for derivatives allows cross-netting that
reduces the counterparty’s net liability to firms in states where it has to post collateral. As we show
below, for this to be the case, the basis risk of the derivative has to be (sufficiently) idiosyncratic.
Intuitively, this requires that firms hedge their cash flow risk using different, imperfectly correlated
derivatives.
For a concrete illustration of the distinction between idiosyncratic and systematic basis risk,
consider firms that, during the recent housing boom, were seeking to hedge their exposure to the
real estate market using derivatives. For these firms, basis risk would have been systematic if all
(or most) firms had entered derivatives referenced to the same index (e.g., the ABX index). If, on
the other hand, firms had chosen a number of different ways to hedge this risk (e.g., using a number
of different indices), then at least some of the resulting basis risk would have been idiosyncratic.
As in the preceding analysis, the key question is how the bankruptcy status of derivatives affects
the collateral requirements of the derivative counterparty. The main difference to the previous
analysis is that this collateral requirement is now based on the derivative counterparty’s net liability
from all derivative contracts.30 We first show that when basis risk is systematic (all firms use the
same or similar derivative contracts), seniority for derivatives does not lead to cross-netting benefits
for the counterparty. Hence, our results from the preceding single-firm analysis carry over, and
making derivatives junior to debt is efficient. When basis risk is idiosyncratic, on the other hand,
cross-netting benefits can be sufficiently large to make seniority for derivatives efficient. Specifically,
when cash flow risk is systematic but basis risk is idiosyncratic, seniority for derivatives allows the
counterparty to reduce its net obligation to firms and, thereby, the required collateral amount,
reducing the deadweight cost of hedging.
22
A. Systematic Basis Risk
We first consider the case where basis risk is systematic. This corresponds to a situation where
all firms use the same derivative to hedge their cash flow risk. Cash flow risk can be either systematic
or idiosyncratic.
Consider first the case in which both cash flow risk and basis risk are systematic. When Z = ZL
the derivative counterparty has a liability on all derivatives it has written, whereas when Z = ZH
all derivatives have moved in favor of the counterparty. Because the counterparty’s balance sheet
is risky, it has to post collateral in the state where it has a liability to firms, thereby incurring
deadweight costs. However, when both cash flow risk and basis risk are systematic, no cross-
netting is possible and the analysis reduces to the single-firm setting discussed in Section V: Because
under senior derivatives the required face value of debt is larger (RJ > RS), the required notional
derivative position is larger under senior derivatives than under junior derivatives (XS > XJ). This
leads to a higher aggregate net liability for the counterparty when Z = ZL, so that the required
collateral is higher under senior derivatives than junior derivatives (ζS > ζJ). Hence, Proposition
5 applies, and deadweight costs are higher when derivatives are senior.31
Now consider the case in which basis risk is systematic but cash flow risk is idiosyncratic. If the
derivative moves against the counterparty (Z = ZL), the counterparty owes XS when derivatives
are senior and XJ when derivatives are junior. In this state, the counterparty has to post collateral.
When the derivative moves in favor of the counterparty (Z = ZH), then all firms owe a payment to
the counterparty (xS or xJ , depending on the seniority status of the derivative contract). In this
state, the counterparty does not have to post collateral because it has a net inflow. If derivatives are
senior, the counterparty receives xS ; if derivatives are junior, the counterparty receives θxJ , because
only firms that receive the high cash flow (a fraction θ) can make the contractual payment xJ . The
required derivative position Xi is equal to Ri − CL1 , and xi is set so that the counterparty breaks
even in expectation taking into account expected costs of posting collateral, where the superscript
i = S, J denotes the bankruptcy ordering of debt and derivatives.
Recall that the amount of required collateral depends only on the size of the net liability in the
state in which the counterparty owes a payment. As we can see from the cash flows above, when
all firms use the same derivative, the seniority for derivatives favors the counterparty in the state
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where it has a net inflow because it affects how many firms make the contractual payment xi to
the counterparty. This is irrelevant for the amount of collateral that is required, which depends
only on the counterparty’s net liability in the state where Z = ZL, such that the derivative moves
against the counterparty. The derivative counterparty’s net liability in that state is larger when
derivatives are senior, XS > XJ , because seniority for derivatives raises the face value of debt,
RJ > RS . This implies that more collateral is required when derivatives are senior (ζS > ζJ) and
junior derivatives are efficient.
These factors taken together show that if basis risk is systematic (all firms use the same deriva-
tive to hedge), no cross-netting benefits arise and junior derivatives are efficient.
B. Idiosyncratic Basis Risk
Now consider the situation where basis risk is idiosyncratic. This corresponds to a situation
where firms use different derivatives to hedge their cash flow risk. As before, cash flow risk can be
either systematic or idiosyncratic.
When both cash flow risk and basis risk are idiosyncratic, the priority ordering of debt and
derivatives is irrelevant. By the law of large numbers, a fraction θ of the counterparty’s derivative
contracts moves in favor of the counterparty (Z = ZH), while a fraction 1 − θ of its derivative
contracts requires the counterparty to make payments to firms (Z = ZL), such that the counter-
party’s balance sheet is deterministic. Given that the counterparty does not face any balance sheet
risk and has no net liability, it does not have to post collateral on any of its derivative contracts
(ζS = ζJ = 0). Hence, while the pricing of the derivative contract will differ depending on the pri-
ority ordering of derivatives relative to debt, no deadweight costs arise and the status of derivatives
in bankruptcy is irrelevant.32
Cross-netting benefits arise when basis risk is idiosyncratic but cash flow risk is systematic.
In this case, seniority for derivatives allows the derivative counterparty to cross-net exposures in
the state in which it has a net liability, thereby reducing the amount of collateral it is required to
post. As we show below, these cross-netting benefits outweigh the detrimental effects from higher
required derivative positions at the firm level. Hence, when basis risk is idiosyncratic but cash flow
risk is systematic, seniority for derivatives is efficient.
To see this, consider first the case when derivatives are senior. Because cash flow risk is sys-
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tematic, either all firms receive the high cash flow or all firms receive the low cash flow. When
all firms receive the low cash flow CL1 , idiosyncratic basis risk implies that a fraction γ of firms
receives a payoff XS from the derivative position. For the remaining fraction 1 − γ of firms, the
derivative moves the wrong way, so that the firms owe a payment xS to the derivative counterparty.
Because they receive the low cash flow and their hedge moves the wrong way, these firms default.
The senior counterparty then receives the full promised payment xS (given the assumption that
xS ≤ CL1 ) while junior creditors receive the remainder CL1 − xS . Conversely, when all firms receive
the high cash flow CH1 , a fraction 1 − (1−θ)(1−γ)θ of firms owes a payment xS to the counterparty,
while the counterparty is required to pay XS to a fraction (1−θ)(1−γ)θ of firms.
When all firms receive the high cash flow, the counterparty’s balance sheet is then given by
A+
[
1− (1− θ) (1− γ)
θ
]
xS − (1− θ) (1− γ)
θ
XS , (39)
assuming that no collateral has to be posted, which we verify below. In contrast, in the low-cash
flow state, the counterparty’s balance sheet is given by
ζSΓ +A− ζS + (1− γ)xS − γXS , (40)
where ζS is the amount of collateral the senior counterparty has to post so that the incentive
constraint
ζSΓ +A− ζS + (1− γ)xS − γXS ≥ p [ζSΓ +A− ζS + (1− γ)xS − γXS]+ (A− ζS)b (41)
is satisfied. The minimum amount of collateral that aligns the counterparty’s incentives is thus
given by
ζS =
γXS − (1− γ)xS −AP
Γ− P . (42)
Equation (42) illustrates the crucial difference to the previous cases, particularly equation (5):
Under idiosyncratic basis risk, seniority for derivatives allows the senior derivative counterparty to
cross-net some of its obligation γXS against payments (1− γ)xS it receives from defaulted firms,
thereby reducing the counterparty’s net liability in the low-cash flow state. The counterparty’s
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ex-ante zero-profit condition is then given by
θxS − (1− θ)XS − (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζS = 0. (43)
Because the counterparty has a net liability in the low-cash flow state, this break-even condition
can be satisfied only if the counterparty has a net gain in the high-cash flow state. This confirms,
as we have assumed above, that no collateral has to be posted in the high cash flow state.
Now consider junior derivatives. In the high-cash flow state, no collateral has to be posted, and
the derivative counterparty’s balance sheet is given by
A+
[
1− (1− θ) (1− γ)
θ
]
xJ − (1− θ) (1− γ)
θ
XJ . (44)
In the low-cash flow state, on the other hand, the counterparty’s balance sheet becomes
ζJΓ +A− ζJ − γXJ , (45)
where, as before, we can obtain the collateral requirement from the incentive constraint:
ζJ =
γXJ −AP
Γ− P . (46)
The zero-profit condition for the counterparty is then given by
[θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xJ − (1− θ)XJ − (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζJ = 0. (47)
Which of the two regimes is more efficient comes down to a comparison of ζS and ζJ . On the
one hand, under junior derivatives the required derivative position XJ is lower than under senior
derivatives because the face value of senior debt RS is lower. To the extent that the derivative
position XJ is smaller, the counterparty has to post less collateral. On the other hand, when
derivatives are junior, the counterparty obtains no income from firms that owe payments to the
counterparty in the low-cash flow state—the entire cash flow of the defaulted firms goes to the
senior creditor. This loss of income increases the required fraction of assets that the counterparty
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must post as collateral. It is a matter of algebra to verify that this latter effect dominates:
γXJ ≥ γXS − (1− γ)xS . (48)
This implies that the net liability for the derivative counterparty in the low-cash flow state is larger
under junior derivatives than under senior derivatives, which implies that ζJ ≥ ζS . In this case
seniority for derivatives is a more efficient arrangement.
We summarize the results on cross-netting benefits in the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 6: Comparison of Junior and Senior Derivatives with Multiple Borrow-
ers. In a multiple-borrower setting, seniority for derivatives is efficient only if it leads to sufficient
cross-netting benefits in states where the derivative counterparty has a net liability. Specifically,
1. It is socially efficient to have debt senior to derivatives when basis risk is systematic (all firms
use the same derivative to hedge).
2. It is socially efficient to have derivatives senior to debt when basis risk is idiosyncratic (firms
use different derivative contracts to hedge) but cash flow risk is systematic.
3. The bankruptcy treatment of derivatives is irrelevant when both basis risk and cash flow risk
are idiosyncratic.
The general insight of Proposition 6 is that, unless the derivative counterparty’s benefits from
cross-netting are significantly sensitive to the priority ordering of derivatives and debt, the efficient
allocation of risk is achieved by an ordering where debt is senior to derivatives. Our analysis reveals
that cross-netting is most sensitive to the priority ordering of debt and derivatives when basis risk is
idiosyncratic but cash flow risk is (mostly) systematic. In this situation, cross-netting benefits are
achieved via the counterparty’s ability to recover payments from failed firms. In all other situations,
there are either no cross-netting benefits to be obtained (when both cash flow risk and basis risk
are mostly systematic) or these benefits do not depend on the priority treatment of derivatives in
bankruptcy (when both cash flow risk and basis risk are mostly idiosyncratic).33
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VII. Strategic Hedging and Strategic Default
Our main analysis is cast in a static framework, in which the firm can commit ex-ante to an
optimal hedging policy. In reality, it is difficult for firms to make such commitments and it is
rare to see covenants in debt contracts restricting the firm’s hedging options. When firms cannot
commit to an optimal hedging policy, they strategically choose their hedging positions ex post to
favor equityholders, potentially at the expense of creditors. The privileged treatment of derivatives
in bankruptcy affects firms’ incentives to enter into strategic hedging positions. In this section, we
analyze the incentives created by this privileged treatment by considering, in turn, two key issues:
(i) under-hedging and excess speculation, and (ii) default due to derivative losses and inefficient
collateral calls.
A. Hedging or Speculation?
No basis risk: We begin by considering the special case where there is no basis risk (γ =
1). Recall that, in this case, under full commitment it is irrelevant for social efficiency whether
derivatives are senior or junior. We now show that when the derivative is chosen ex post by the
firm (and in the interest of its shareholders), then the privileged treatment of derivatives invites
inefficient strategic behavior.
If the firm’s shareholders cannot commit to a derivative position, their ex post incentives to
hedge are too low. To see this, assume that creditors expect that the firm will optimally hedge,
so that R = F . Taking the face value of debt R as given, it is in the firm’s ex post interest to
eliminate credit risk by choosing a derivative position of X = F − CL1 whenever
(1− θ)C2 − (1− θ)
[
F − CL1
]− δ [F − CL1 −AP] > 0. (49)
The first term in (49) is the benefit to the firm from being able to continue in the low-cash flow state.
The second term in (49) is the actuarially fair cost of the derivative. The third term captures the
deadweight cost of hedging. Comparing this condition to (15) we see that, under no commitment,
the firm’s incentives to hedge are strictly lower than is socially optimal. This is an illustration of
the well-known observation that equityholders have suboptimal risk-taking incentives once risky
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debt is in place.
Assuming that the firm can only take long positions in the derivative, hedging incentives are
independent of the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives. If, however, the firm can take short
positions in the derivative, an additional effect emerges and the bankruptcy treatment matters: If
the derivative contract is senior, the firm is able to dilute the creditor by taking a short position in
the derivative. By doing so, the firm transfers resources that would usually accrue to the creditor
in the default state into the high-cash flow state, in which they accrue to equityholders. Hence,
when the derivative is senior to debt, a derivative that could function as a perfect hedge may well
be deployed as a vehicle for speculation or risk shifting.
More formally, assume that (1− θ)C2 − δ
(
F − CL1 −AP
)
> 0, so that it is socially optimal
for the firm to hedge. When derivatives have seniority, we now have to compare the firm’s payoff
from hedging not only to the payoff from taking no derivative position, but also to the payoff
from taking a short position in the derivative. It is straightforward to verify that the firm always
(weakly) prefers taking a short position in the derivative to taking no position at all. Therefore,
the firm will hedge in equilibrium only if the payoffs from hedging exceed the payoffs from taking a
short position. Comparing these payoffs, we see that hedging is now privately optimal if, and only
if,
(1− θ)C2 − (1− θ)
[
F − CL1
]− δ [F − CL1 −AP]− (1− θ)2CL1 + δAP1− θ + δ > 0. (50)
The additional term in this condition relative to condition (49) establishes that hedging is harder to
sustain when short positions in the derivative are allowed. In addition, in cases where it is optimal
not to hedge at all, the firm always takes an inefficient short position in the derivative.
PROPOSITION 7: When the derivative has no basis risk (γ = 1) and the firm cannot commit to
a derivative position when entering the debt contract:
1. The firm’s private incentives to hedge are strictly less than the social incentives to hedge.
2. When only long positions in the derivative are possible, the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives
does not matter for efficiency.
3. When the firm can take short “speculative” positions in the derivative, the bankruptcy treat-
ment of derivatives matters: Under senior derivatives, the firm may choose to take a specu-
lative position in the derivative to dilute its creditors. This is strictly inefficient and restricts
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the subset of parameters for which the efficient hedging position can be sustained.
Proposition 7 illustrates in the simplest possible setting another first-order inefficiency of senior-
ity for derivatives: Rather than using derivatives as hedging tools, firms may strategically engage
in risk shifting by speculating with senior derivatives. This is not possible when derivatives are
junior to debt.34
Basis risk: Consider now the general case with basis risk (γ < 1). If C2 is large enough that
the firm finds it optimal to hedge, it would never want to take a derivative position that is smaller
than R−CL1 . Under senior derivatives the firm may, however, have an incentive to take a derivative
position that strictly exceeds R−CL1 , which is inefficient given the deadweight cost of hedging. To
see this, assume that derivatives are senior and consider the firm’s objective function with respect
to hedging after it has already committed to a debt repayment of R. When it is privately desirable
for the firm to minimize default, the firm’s optimal derivative position XS
∗
maximizes the firm’s
payoff subject to the constraint that XS
∗ ≥ R− CL1 :
max
XS∗≥R−CL1
θ
[
CH1 −R+
1− θ
θ
(1− γ)XS∗ −
[
1− 1− θ
θ
(1− γ)
]
x
(
XS
∗)]
+ (1− θ) γ
[
CL1 +X
S∗ −R
]
+ [θ + (1− θ) γ]C2, (51)
where the promised payment to the counterparty x
(
XS
∗)
is determined by the protection seller’s
break-even constraint.
To see why the firm may take an inefficiently large derivative position, it is instructive to look at
its marginal payoff from increasing its derivative position beyond the optimal size XS = RJ −CL1 :
1− θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal derivative payoff
−
[
1− 1− θ
θ
(1− γ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤
[
1− θ + (1− θ)(1− Γ)
Γ− P
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost of derivative
≷ 0. (52)
The first term is the extra derivative payoff to the firm from increasing its derivative position
by one unit. It is equal to (1 − θ) because an increase in the derivative’s notional value generates
an additional dollar for the firm with probability (1 − θ). The second term is the share of the
marginal cost of an additional unit of the derivative that is borne by the firm’s shareholders. The
full marginal cost of an additional unit in notional derivative exposure is given by its actuarially fair
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marginal cost (1− θ) plus the marginal increase in the hedging cost δ = (1−θ)(1−Γ)Γ−P . However, this
cost is borne by the firm’s shareholders only in states in which they have a positive residual claim.
In the default state, the marginal cost of the derivative is paid by the creditor, when the derivative
is senior to debt. Thus, the firm’s shareholders do not internalize the full cost of increasing the
firm’s derivative position when derivatives are senior and therefore may have an incentive to take
a derivative position that is inefficiently large.
From (52) we can deduce that the firm’s shareholders’ optimal derivative position coincides
with the socially optimal derivative position only when the derivative has relatively little basis
risk: γ ≥ γ. When the derivative has significant basis risk, γ < γ, the firm will enter a derivative
position that is too large from a social perspective. Given that hedging costs are linear, when
the firm chooses to increase the derivative position beyond the efficient level, it will increase its
derivative position to the point where it completely expropriates the creditor in the default state.
It then chooses a position XS
∗
such that x
(
XS
∗)
= CL1 . This is summarized in the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 8: Senior derivatives may lead to inefficiently large derivative positions.
Assume that it is privately optimal for the firm to hedge default risk. When the firm cannot commit
to a derivative position ex ante, the firm’s shareholders’ optimal derivative position coincides with
the optimal derivative position only if γ ≥ γ, where
γ = 1− δθ
(1− θ)(1− θ + δ) . (53)
When γ < γ the firm chooses a derivative position that is inefficiently large and sets XS
∗
such that
x
(
XS
∗)
= CL1 , or
XS
∗
γ<γ =
θ
1− θ + δC
L
1 . (54)
The incentive to take inefficiently large derivative positions disappears when derivatives are
junior to debt. To see this, consider the firm’s ex post objective with respect to hedging with junior
derivatives. The firm’s surplus is unchanged relative to (51), except that the promised payment to
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the derivative x(XS
∗
) is now determined by (30):
x
(
XS
∗)
=
(1− θ)XS∗ + δ (XS∗ −AP)
θ − (1− θ) (1− γ) . (55)
Differentiating (51) and (55) with respect to XS
∗
then reveals that, under junior derivatives, the
firm has no incentive to take an excessively large derivative position. Indeed, the marginal payoff
from increasing the derivative position beyond RS − CL1 is now given by − (1−θ)(1−Γ)A(1−P) < 0. This is
intuitive: Under junior derivatives, the firm bears the full marginal cost of an additional unit of
derivative exposure. Since the derivative is priced at actuarially fair terms net of the deadweight
hedging cost, the firm cannot gain from increasing its derivative exposure beyond RS − CL1 .
PROPOSITION 9: Under junior derivatives there is no incentive to take excessively
large derivative positions. When derivatives are junior, the firm chooses the efficient derivative
position whenever it is privately optimal for the firm to hedge.
One implication of our analysis in this section is that, under the current privileged bankruptcy
treatment for derivatives, firms may take derivative positions that are excessively large from a social
perspective. This is true even though derivatives are fundamentally value-enhancing in our model
as risk management tools. As shown above, the firm’s shareholders’ incentives to enter excessively
large derivative positions is tightly linked to the basis risk of the derivative contract available for
hedging. When basis risk is sufficiently small, the firm has no incentives to take excessively large
positions. But when basis risk is large, the firm’s shareholders have an incentive to take excessively
large derivative positions, thereby diluting existing creditors. The derivative then becomes a vehicle
for speculation rather than a hedging tool.
While this analysis suggests that the senior status of derivatives is an incentive for shareholders
to speculate at the expense of creditors, there can also be situations where seniority of derivatives
provides a crucial incentive for shareholders to hedge for the benefit of the firm as a whole. To
illustrate this possibility we now consider situations where the firm’s shareholders may have no
incentive to hedge ex post. As is well known, once debt is in place the benefit to shareholders from
hedging can be smaller than the total gain to the firm, as the firm’s creditors also stand to gain
from the hedge (see, for example, Smith and Stulz (1985)). This observation suggests that ex post
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hedging incentives for shareholders could be inefficiently low, or equivalently that shareholders may
want to unwind existing hedges once debt is in place (due to risk-shifting considerations a` la Jensen
and Meckling (1976)).35
In this case, there could thus be advantages to having derivatives senior to debt, as then the
costs as well as the benefits of hedging will be shared between debtholders and equityholders. In our
setting, this is the case when C2 is relatively low. Specifically, it can be shown that when derivatives
are junior to debt it is optimal for the firm’s shareholders to hedge if C2 > C¯2, and when derivatives
are senior to debt it is optimal for shareholders to hedge when C2 > C˜2. Depending on parameter
values, it is possible that C˜2 < C¯2, so that a region exists where the firm chooses to hedge ex post
only when derivatives are senior to debt.36
B. Default Due to Derivative Losses and Inefficient Collateral Calls
Up to now we have assumed that the required debt and derivative payments are such that the
firm meets all its obligations when it receives the high cash flow CH1 and is required to make a
payment on the derivative. While this helped simplify our analysis, this assumption is not without
loss of generality. The reason is that the firm can make the required payment R + x only if it has
sufficient resources to do so. Moreover, even if there are sufficient resources in the firm, the firm
may have an incentive to default strategically in states where payment is due both on debt and
the derivative (recall that up to now we have assumed that C2 is large enough that this incentive
constraint is satisfied).
We now show that default due to derivative losses in the high state is more likely, the higher
the level of collateralization (and thus effective seniority) of derivative contracts. Moreover, we
show that this problem is exacerbated when the firm has no way of invoking a stay on inefficient
collateral calls by the derivative counterparty.
B.1. Default Due to Derivative Losses
Suppose that the firm can choose to partially collateralize derivatives up to an amount x ≤ x.
Recall that, in this case, only the amount x can be seized by the counterparty in the event of default.
The remainder of the counterparty’s claim against the firm x−x is treated as a regular debt claim
in bankruptcy. For simplicity we assume that this remainder is junior to the debtholder’s claim.
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The reason that default in the high state is more likely when the level of collateralization x of
the derivative is higher is that a higher level of collateralization of the derivative contract leads to a
larger required total payment on debt and derivatives, R (x) +x (x) , in states where the derivative
moves against the firm. Intuitively, while more collateralization decreases the stand-alone cost of
the derivative x (x), this effect is more than outweighed by a concomitant increase in the face value
of debt R (x), such that the total required payment increases. However, a higher total required
payment makes it more difficult to satisfy the constraint that the firm not default (either due to
lack of resources or strategically) when it receives the high cash flow and the derivative moves in
favor of the counterparty.
In the high-cash flow state, the firm defaults due to lack of resources when R (x) + x (x) > CH1 .
The firm defaults strategically whenever defaulting and pocketing CH1 − CL1 yields strictly more
than making the contractual payment R (x) + x (x) and collecting continuation value C2. Hence,
strategic default occurs when
CH1 − CL1 > CH1 − [R (x) + x (x)] + C2, (56)
which is the case when R (x) + x (x) > CL1 + C2.
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PROPOSITION 10: Default due to losses on the derivative position. The firm meets its
payment obligations when it receives the high cash flow but the derivative moves against the firm as
long as
R (x) + x (x) ≤ min [CH1 , CL1 + C2] . (57)
Condition (57) is harder to satisfy the higher the level of collateralization for derivatives x:
∂R (x)
∂x
+
∂x (x)
∂x
=
δ (1− γ) (1− θ)
[θ − (1− γ) (1− θ)] [θ + γ (1− θ)] > 0. (58)
Proposition 10 establishes that the no-default constraint in the high-cash flow state (either due
to lack of resources when R (x) +x (x) ≤ CH1 or to strategic default when R (x) +x (x) ≤ CL1 +C2)
is harder to satisfy when the derivative is more highly collateralized and thereby more senior. In
other words, the critical value of the setup cost F for which the firm is able to hedge without
defaulting in the high-cash flow state is lower the higher is x.
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COROLLARY 3: Derivatives can be used to hedge the low-cash flow state without causing default
in the high-cash flow state as long as
F ≤ F (x) = K0CL1 +K1 min
[
CH1 , C
L
1 + C2
]
+K2AP −K3x, (59)
where K0 ,K1, and K2 are positive constants, and
K3 =
(1− γ) (1− θ) δ
θ + γ (1− θ) + δ . (60)
Since K3 ≥ 0, F (x) is decreasing in the level of collateralization x.
B.2. Inefficient Collateral Calls
Finally, we extend the model to show how the exemption of derivatives from the automatic stay
under Chapter 11 can lead to inefficient collateral calls by the derivative counterparty. To model
collateral calls, we introduce into the model a working capital demand for the firm, which can also
play the role of unassigned cash collateral. Specifically, suppose that the firm requires working
capital or cash to be able to generate the date 2 cash flow C2. Let y = D − F be the amount of
working capital in the firm, where D is the amount of funding the firm raises at date 0, and F is
the amount it spends on fixed investment. Suppose also for simplicity that the firm can generate
the second-period cash flow only if there is sufficient working capital in the firm:
C2 (y) =
 V if y ≥ κ0 otherwise , (61)
where V > 0 and κ > 0. Moreover, the working capital used to generate C2 is spent by the firm
before the realization of the date 1 cash flow, so that it is no longer available to make payments to
the creditor or derivative counterparty at that point.
Consider briefly the outcome absent derivatives: If V is sufficiently large, it is optimal for the
firm to hold sufficient working capital; that is, it is optimal to raise D = F + κ at date 0 and to
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hold working capital y = κ. The payoff to the firm absent derivatives is then given by
θ
(
CH1 −R+ V
)
(62)
where R is determined by the following break-even condition:
θR+ (1− θ)CL1 = F + κ. (63)
Now consider the outcome in the presence of derivatives when the firm does not have the
protection of a stay on collateral calls by the derivative counterparty. As we will show, this may
then give rise to inefficient collateral calls on the firm. In particular, if the derivative moves against
the firm, the counterparty to the derivative transaction may find it privately optimal to make a
collateral call on the firm’s cash in order to ensure full payment on the derivative, even if this
reduces overall surplus because it drives the firm into default.
More formally, consider the following time line:
1. The firm writes a debt contract with the lender and borrows an amount D = F + κ.
2. The firm enters a derivative contract (x,X) with the counterparty. This contract involves
basis risk γ.
3. The counterparty observes the realization of Z before the realization of the first-period cash
flow; if Z = ZH , the counterparty can initiate a procedure to collect x. If there is no stay,
the counterparty can immediately make a collateral call on the cash available to the firm κ
(and subsequently when C1 realizes). In that case, the firm would be deprived of its working
capital, with the consequence that C2 = 0.
4. If the firm has working capital available, it spends it before the realization of C1 and then
receives C2 = V at date 2, provided that the firm is not liquidated before then.
5. First-period cash flow C1 is realized. When C1 = C
H
1 and payment is due on the derivative,
the firm chooses whether or not to make the contractual payment R+x; when C1 = C
H
1 and
the firm receives a payment X from the derivative, or when C1 = C
L
1 and the firm receives a
payment X from the derivative, the firm chooses whether to repay R. When C1 = C
L
1 and
the firm must make a payment x on the derivative, the firm defaults.
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6. If the firm continues to the second period and is able to use its working capital, it obtains V .
Given this timeline, the firm is exposed to inefficient collateral calls (effectively a run on working
capital) if the firm cannot invoke an automatic stay against collateral calls from a derivative coun-
terparty. To see this, suppose that the firm borrows F + κ and takes out a derivative promising to
pay X = R−CL1 when Z = ZL, against a payment x = [(1− θ + δ)X]/θ when Z = ZH (assuming
that the derivative is senior to debt and that x ≤ CL1 + κ).
In this case, it is a best response for the derivative counterparty to make a collateral call
immediately on the realization of ZH . If it makes such a collateral call, the firm ends up with
insufficient working capital, so that C2 = 0. Because of the collateral call, the firm also chooses
to strategically default when CH1 is realized, because when C2 = 0 running away with C
H
1 − CL1 is
strictly more profitable than making the required payment R + x on the debt and the derivative:
CH1 − CL1 > CH1 − R − x. The derivative counterparty, however, is still able to fully recover its
claim because x ≤ CL1 + κ. Note that, even though it is the collateral call that pushes the firm
into default, it is privately optimal for the derivative counterparty to ask for collateral. Should it
not make that collateral call, the derivative counterparty would lose access to κ and, in the case
that CL1 realizes, can only hope to receive a maximum amount C
L
1 at date 1. Thus, making an
immediate collateral call is strictly optimal for the counterparty if CL1 + κ ≥ x > CL1 .
The collateral call by the counterparty is inefficient because it invariably leads to a loss of
C2 (and strategic default) in a state where, absent the collateral call, the firm would continue.
Moreover, the collateral call is not needed for the derivative counterparty to break even. When
V is sufficiently large, the firm’s incentive to continue can support a high enough payment by the
firm such that both the creditor and derivative counterparty break even in expectation. A stay on
collateral calls by the counterparty would prevent this outcome.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper provides a tractable and transparent model to analyze the ex ante and ex post
consequences of granting (effective) seniority to derivative contracts. The special treatment of
derivatives in bankruptcy has been carved out with the main objective of providing stability to
derivative markets. Over the years, exemptions for derivatives, swaps, and repo markets have been
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gradually extended, with the same stability objective in mind, largely as a result of a concerted push
by ISDA to codify its “master agreements” (see Morgan (2008)). Remarkably, however, up to now
there has been essentially no systematic analysis of the likely ex post and ex ante consequences of
this special bankruptcy treatment. With the exception of a few law articles (most notably Edwards
and Morrison (2005), who point to the potential destabilizing effect of the bankruptcy exemptions
in the failures of LTCM and Enron), the general presumption was that the effect of the privileged
bankruptcy treatment for derivatives was to strengthen derivative markets, to enhance financial
stability, and that the effects on firms’ cost of debt would be negligible. In contrast, our analysis
suggests that, once ex post and ex ante effects of the bankruptcy treatment of derivatives are taken
into account, the overall benefits of the special bankruptcy treatment for derivatives are no longer
obvious.
Finally, some of the insights of our analysis may have policy relevance beyond the particular
setting discussed in this paper. First, carefully taking into account ex ante consequences is likely
similarly important with respect to the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) for systemically im-
portant financial institutions, which was created as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Under
OLA, all Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs), which include swaps, repos, and other derivatives,
are transferred into a solvent bridge bank, such that counterparties are fully protected and therefore
“prohibited from terminating their contracts and liquidating and netting out their positions” (see
p. 9 in FDIC (2011)). While this responds to the potential ex post inefficiencies that can result
from the exemption of the automatic stay under Chapter 11 bankruptcy (e.g., large-scale collateral
liquidations), the treatment of QFCs under OLA may exacerbate ex ante distortions. For exam-
ple, this solution may incentivize financial institutions to increasingly rely on QFCs as a source of
funding and thereby substitute away from subordinated debt, which will be at risk of substantial
haircuts under OLA.
Second, our analysis relates to the current debate on moving derivative contracts to clearing-
houses. Similar to the transfer of risk to unsecured creditors highlighted in this paper, moving
derivatives to clearinghouses reduces credit risk for those parties that are part of the clearing-
house, but increases credit risk for those that remain outside of the clearinghouse (see also Roe
(2011a)). These repercussions should be taken into account when designing optimal clearinghouse
arrangements and determining which contracts and market participants should be included in the
38
clearinghouse.
IX. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The steps needed to calculate the cost of the derivative as a function
of the level of collateralization x are given below in the section characterizing the equilibrium
under partial collateralization. As shown there, holding R fixed and assuming that x ≤ CL1 , the
counterparty’s break-even condition implies that
x (x) =
(1− θ) [R− CL1 + δ (R− CL1 −AP)]− (1− θ) (1− γ)x
θ − (1− θ) (1− γ) . (64)
With R held fixed, this implies
∂x (x)
∂x
= − (1− θ) (1− γ)
θ − (1− θ) (1− γ) < 0. (65)
Hence, taking the face value of debt as given, the cost of the derivative is decreasing in the
level of collateralization of the derivative as long as x ≤ CL1 . When x > CL1 , a further increase in
collateralization does not change the payoff of the derivative counterparty, such that in this region
the cost of the derivative is unchanged.
Senior derivatives when xS > CL1 : Here we describe the equilibrium under senior derivatives
when xS > CL1 , which we left out in the main text for space considerations. The main difference to
the case discussed in the text is that the break-even conditions for the derivative counterparty and
the creditor change. In particular, when xS > CL1 the derivative counterparty receives the entire
cash flow when the firm defaults. The break-even conditions for the creditor and the counterparty
become
[θ + γ (1− θ)]RJ = F (66)
[θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xS + (1− γ) (1− θ)CL1 = (1− θ)
[
XS + (1− Γ) ζS] . (67)
39
Inserting XS = RJ − CL1 and solving (66) and (67) for RJ and xS yields
RJ =
F
θ + γ (1− θ) (68)
xS =
(1− θ + δ) (F − [θ + γ (1− θ)]CL1 )− δ [θ + γ (1− θ)]AP
θ [θ + γ (1− θ)] . (69)
Characterization of equilibrium under partial collateralization: This section contains
the break-even conditions used to derive the equilibrium under partial collateralization. Under
partial collateralization, the derivative counterparty is senior up to an amount x. The remainder,
x− x, is junior to the creditor’s claim. The required derivative position is given by
X (x) = R (x)− CL1 . (70)
The creditor’s and counterparty’s break-even conditions are given by
[θ + (1− θ) γ]R (x) + (1− θ) (1− γ) (CL1 − x) = F (71)
[θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]x (x) + (1− θ) (1− γ)x = (1− θ) [R (x)− CL1 + (1− Γ) ζ (x)] , (72)
where
ζ (x) =
R (x)− CL1 −AP
Γ− P . (73)
Solving (71) and (72) for R (x) and x (x), we obtain
R (x) =
F − (1− θ) (1− γ) (CL1 − x)
θ + (1− θ) γ (74)
x (x) =
(1− θ + δ) [F − CL1 ]− δ [θ + γ (1− θ)]AP− (1− θ) (1− γ) [θ − (1− γ) (1− θ)− δ]x
[θ − (1− γ) (1− θ)] [θ + γ (1− θ)] .
(75)
Proof of Proposition 6: Following substitution of XJ , and γXS + (1− γ)xS for their equi-
librium values, we can rewrite γXJ ≤ γXS − (1− γ)xS as
θ (1− γ) [(1− θ + γδ) (F − CL1 )− δ (θ + (1− θ) γ)AP]
[θ + (1− θ) γ] [θ − (1− θ) (1− γ) + δθ (1− γ)] ≥ 0. (76)
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The denominator of this expression is positive. To see this, note that
θ − (1− θ) (1− γ) = Pr [C1 = CH1 , Z = ZL] ≥ 0.
Hence, (76) is positive if
(1− θ + γδ) (F − CL1 ) ≥ δ (θ + (1− θ) γ)AP (77)
F − CL1
θ + (1− θ) γ ≥
δ
1− θ + γδAP. (78)
From the creditor’s break-even condition under junior derivatives,
θ + (1− θ) γRS + (1− θ) (1− γ)CL1 = F, (79)
we know that RS − CL1 = F−C
L
1
θ+(1−θ)γ . Substituting this into (78) and multiplying by γ, we obtain
γ
(
RS − CL1
) ≥ γδ
1− θ + γδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
AP. (80)
As long as there are deadweight costs of hedging under junior derivatives (i.e., γ
(
RS − CL1
)
> AP),
condition (80) is always satisfied. When γ
(
RS − CL1
) ≤ AP, no deadweight costs are incurred in
either regime, and thus the bankruptcy ordering is irrelevant.
Proof of Proposition 7: The first two statements in the proposition follow directly from the
discussion in the text. To derive equation (50), we need to compare the payoff to the firm from
hedging, which is given by the NPV minus the deadweight cost of hedging,
θCH1 + (1− θ)CL1 + C2 − F − δ(F − CL1 −AP), (81)
to the payoff from entering a speculative short derivative position. (The deviation to a speculative
short position is always more profitable for the firm than a deviation to taking no derivative
position at all.) If, ex ante, creditors expect the firm to hedge and thus set R = F, the payoff to
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the speculative short derivative position is given by
θ
(
CH1 +Xshort − F
)
+ θC2, (82)
where Xshort is the derivative position that fully expropriates the creditor in the default state (i.e.,
xshort = C
L
1 ). Xshort can be determined from the counterparty’s break-even condition
(1− θ)CL1 = θXshort +
θ
1− θ δ (Xshort −AP) . (83)
The firm chooses to hedge when (81) exceeds (82), which leads to equation (50).
Proof of Proposition 10: Assume that the firm receives the high cash flow CH1 but has to
make a payment x (x) on its derivative position. The firm will meet its total payment obligation
R (x) + x (x) under two conditions. First, the cash available to the firm must be sufficient, which
is the case whenever
CH1 − [R (x) + x (x)] ≥ 0. (84)
Second, the firm must have no incentive to default strategically. This is the case whenever
CH1 − [R (x) + x (x)] + C2 ≥ CH1 − CL1 . (85)
The left-hand side is the payoff from making the contractual payment and continuing, whereas the
right-hand side is the payoff from declaring default, pocketing CH1 −CL1 , and letting the creditor and
the derivative counterparty split CH1 . Overall, the firm will thus meet its contractual obligations if
R (x) + x (x) ≤ min [CH1 , CL1 + C2] . (86)
Equation (58) follows from taking the derivatives of equations (74) and (75) and simplifying.
Proof of Corollary 3: The result follows from substituting (74) and (75) into (57) and
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simplifying. The constants not given in the main text are
K0 =
(1− θ) (1− γ) [θ − (1− γ) (1− θ)] + 1− θ + δ
θ + γ (1− θ) + δ , (87)
K1 =
[θ − (1− γ) (1− θ)] [θ + γ (1− θ)]
θ + γ (1− θ) + δ , (88)
and
K2 =
δ [θ + γ (1− θ)]
θ + γ (1− θ) + δ . (89)
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Notes
1Similarly, under FDIC receivership there is essentially no stay on derivative contracts. If not
transferred to a new counterparty by 5 pm EST on the business day after the FDIC has been
appointed receiver, derivative, swap, and repo counterparties can close out their positions and take
possession of collateral. See, for example, Summe (2010, p. 66).
2For example, under current bank resolution law in the U.K. and Germany, closeout and netting
provisions may not always be enforceable (see Hellwig (2011)).
3See, in particular, Grossman and Hart (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996), Aghion
and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998).
4This result mirrors classic findings in the literature on corporate risk management, such as
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993).
5Under some parameter values (e.g., when the firm’s continuation value is relatively low), the
ability to dilute ex post is necessary to sustain a value-enhancing hedge: When the firm’s continua-
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tion value is low, the beneficiaries from a hedge are disproportionately the firm’s debtholders. But
when debt has seniority over derivatives, the costs of the hedge are mostly borne by shareholders.
In such a situation, reversing the priority order so that derivatives are senior to debt can provide
an efficient incentive for shareholders to hedge.
6Another related distortion produced by the privileged treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy is
that firms have an incentive to masquerade debt as derivatives in order to protect creditors against
dilution by derivatives. If debt can easily be dressed up as a swap and thereby obtains the same
treatment as derivatives in bankruptcy, the overall effect of the exemption for derivatives is to
hollow out the stability provided by the automatic stay. Although we do not explicitly model this
distortion, it is likely to be another important unintended consequence of the special bankruptcy
treatment of derivatives.
7See, in particular, Edwards and Morrison (2005), Bliss and Kaufman (2006), Lubben (2009),
Roe (2011b), Skeel and Jackson (2012), and Duffie and Skeel (2012).
8Recent papers by Antinolfi, Carapella, Kahn, Mills, and Nosal (2012), Acharya, Anshuman,
and Viswanathan (2012), and Auh and Sundaresan (2013) also offer an ex ante and ex post analysis
of exemptions from the automatic stay, but with a specific focus on repo contracts. Oehmke (2014)
provides a model of collateral fire sales that can occur after defaults in the repo markets. Infante
(2013) explores the ex ante implications of collateral fire sales.
9In practice, there are examples of state-contingent contracts that bundle financing and risk
management, for example, when hedging services are provided by the original lender. One advan-
tage of the bundled contract is that the party providing the bundle internalizes transfers between
the financing and hedging portions of the bundle. Although some banks bundle bank loans with
derivative contracts, such contracting practice is the exception rather than the norm (see Cooper
and Mello (1999)).
10The discussion in this section is kept intentionally brief and draws mainly on Roe (2011b). For
more detail on the legal treatment of derivatives, see also Edwards and Morrison (2005) and Bliss
and Kaufman (2006).
11As pointed out by Roe (2011b, p. 5), “The Code sets forth priorities in §§ 507 and 726, and
those basic priorities are unaffected by derivative status.”
12If after selling all the posted collateral a derivative counterparty still has a claim on the firm,
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this remaining claim becomes a regular unsecured claim in Chapter 11. Hence, collateralization is
key to the effective seniority of derivative contracts.
13The advantages from netting are best illustrated through a simple example. Suppose that a
firm has two counterparties, A and B. The firm owes $10 to A. The firm owes $10 to B, and, in
another transaction, B owes $5 to the firm. Suppose that when the firm declares bankruptcy there
are $10 of assets in the firm. When creditor B cannot net its claims, it has to pay $5 into the firm.
The bankruptcy mass is thus $15. A and B have remaining claims of $10 each, such that they
equally divide the bankruptcy mass and each receive $7.5. The net payoff to creditor B is $7.5-$5
= $2.5. When creditor B can net its claim, it does not need to make a payment to the firm at the
time of default. Rather, it now has a net claim of $5 on the bankrupt firm. As before, A has a
claim of $10 on the firm. There is now $10 to distribute, such that A receives 2/3*$10 = $6.66 and
creditor B receives 1/3*$10 = $3.33. Hence, with netting, B receives a net payoff of $3.33, while
without netting it receives only $2.5.
14If the firm is a bank, then the above assumptions mean that beyond the minimum equity capital
requirement, which we normalize to zero, the bank must raise the entire amount needed for the
loan in the form of deposits. In what follows, when we interpret the firm as a bank, the creditor is
a bank depositor, and R denotes the gross interest payment on deposits of size F .
15Verifiability of the realization of Z and the payment of the amount due under the derivative
contract means that, in contrast to cash flows generated by the firm’s operations, returns from
derivative positions can be contracted on without commitment or enforceability problems.
16The derivative thus has payoffs that are equivalent to a swap contract, one of the most common
derivatives used for hedging purposes in practice: It has value zero when entered and then moves
in favor of the firm or the counterparty, depending on the realization of Z.
17Note that the binary cash flow setup of our paper means that there is no intensive margin for
the hedging decision. Any derivative of size X ≥ R−CL1 prevents default in the low-cash flow state
with probability γ, while a derivative position of size X < R−CL1 is not an effective hedge. If the
number of possible cash flow realizations is larger than two, such adjustment along the intensive
margin is possible, but would not affect our main findings. We discuss this extension in the Internet
Appendix available at http://www.afajof.org/details/page/3626901/Supplements.html.
18We have chosen the unconditional payoff probability of the derivative to coincide with the
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probability that the low cash flow obtains (both are equal to 1 − θ). This assumption is not
necessary for the analysis. However, it has the convenient feature that when γ = 1, the derivative
is a perfect hedge: It pays off if, and only if, the firm’s cash flow is low.
19If the counterparty were not to post collateral, it would choose action a = 0 when it observes
signal sL and the incentive constraint is violated. This would result in a loss for the firm, which
would only receive the promised payment X with probability p < 1. For simplicity, we assume that
the derivative counterparty has to make its promises credible by posting collateral. Biais, Heider,
and Hoerova (2012) also treat the case of endogenous counterparty risk. In our analysis, the main
adjustment from allowing for this case would be that deadweight costs could take the form of either
costly collateral or costly endogenous counterparty risk.
20When X ≤ AP, no collateral needs to be posted, such that no deadweight is incurred. Strictly
speaking, the expression for the deadweight costs should thus be δ (X −AP)+ . For notational
simplicity, we suppress this detail in the remainder of the paper.
21While our discussion above highlights frictions in the derivative market, note that our model
treats debt and derivative markets symmetrically: Imposing on the firm’s creditor the same friction
that we impose on the derivative counterparty would lead to no change in the model. The firm’s
creditor never has a net liability to the firm after entering the debt contract and thus never has to
post collateral to preserve incentives.
22The cash the firm assigns as collateral to the derivatives margin account is obtained either
from retained earnings or from the initial investment by the creditor. Retained earnings can be
modeled by assuming that, after the firm sinks the setup cost F at date 0, the project first yields
a sure return CL1 at date 1
−. At that point it is still unknown whether the full period 1 return
will be CH1 or C
L
1 ; that is, the firm knows only that it will receive an incremental cash flow at date
1 of ∆C1 = C
H
1 − CL1 with probability θ, and 0 with probability (1 − θ). To hedge the risk with
respect to this incremental cash flow, the firm can then take a derivative position by pledging cash
collateral x ≤ CL1 . Alternatively, the cash collateral x can be obtained from the creditor at date 0
by raising a total amount F + x from the creditor. Either way of modeling cash collateral works in
our setup.
23In practice, such a claim could be classified in the same priority class as debt. We do not
explicitly consider this case, since the pro rata allocation of assets to derivative counterparties and
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debtholders that arises in this case considerably complicates the formal analysis, without yielding
any substantive additional economic insights.
24The case where x > CL1 can be treated in an analogous way, but is omitted for brevity.
25For example, the face value of a junior debt contract is RJ , whereas the pricing terms and
collateral requirement of a senior derivative contract are given by XS , xS , and ζS .
26We follow Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2012) here by assuming that collateral must not be
posted ex ante, and that the contract specifies a collateral requirement only in the event that the
derivative contract moves against the counterparty: that is, only when signal sL is observed. There
would be no qualitative change to our analysis if we imposed the collateral requirement up front.
27For a more formal justification of this assumption, assume there is a continuum of Z-variables
that may potentially be used to hedge the firm’s business risk, but that at the ex ante contracting
stage it is not yet known which of these potential Z-variables will be the relevant one from a risk
management perspective. However, once the firm is in operation and learns more about its business
environment, it can determine the relevant variable Z. This lack of knowledge on the relevant
random variable Z ex ante would effectively prevent the firm from contracting on a particular
derivative position or from making the debt contract contingent on the relevant Z-variable. Hence,
it is more plausible that the firm chooses its derivative position after signing the initial debt contract.
This assumption broadly reflects current market practice: Firms usually choose their derivative
exposure for a given amount of debt only ex post. Moreover, in practice relatively few bonds or
loans include direct restrictions on future derivative positions taken by the debtor. Nonetheless,
we briefly discuss the optimal Z-contingent contract in footnote 34.
28To the extent that the incentive to collateralize ex post is undesirable, an important question
is whether the firm can commit ex ante not to collateralize its derivative position ex post, for
example via covenants that restrict such collateralization. Under current U.S. bankruptcy law this
is difficult: If a breach of such a covenant is discovered in bankruptcy, the collateral has already left
the firm and generally cannot be recovered by lenders (see Bjerre (1999)). Hence, such covenants
would require significant monitoring.
29When xS > CL1 , the counterparty receives the entire cash flow C
L
1 in the event that Z = Z
H
and C1 = C
L
1 . In the interest of brevity we focus on the first case, x
S ≤ CL1 , in the main text. The
second case is covered in the appendix.
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30In other words, we assume that the counterparty’s obligations to one firm can be cross-netted
with payments it receives from other firms. Indeed, in practice the amount of required collateral
for OTC derivatives is a function of the soundness of the counterparty’s balance sheet, which in
turn depends on the cross-netting benefits the counterparty can rely on across its diverse contracts
with different firms.
31The details for this case are available in the Internet Appendix available at http://www.
afajof.org/details/page/3626901/Supplements.html.
32The details for this case are available in the Internet Appendix available at http://www.
afajof.org/details/page/3626901/Supplements.html.
33This insight is related to Duffie and Zhu (2011), who show that clearing through a central
clearing counterparty (CCP) is efficient if the benefits from multilateral netting across counterpar-
ties that arise under a CCP arrangement exceed the cross-product netting benefits that are lost by
clearing trades on a CCP.
34This simple setting without basis risk is also useful to illustrate the situation where the firm
and creditor are able to write a state-contingent contract based on the realization of Z at date 0. If
the firm can commit not to take on additional derivative positions ex post, such a state-contingent
contract (which can be viewed as a contract that bundles financing and hedging) makes the stand-
alone derivative redundant: The optimal state-contingent contract would set R
(
ZL
)
= CL1 to
eliminate default in the low-cash flow state and R
(
ZH
)
=
[
F − (1− θ)CL1
]
/θ to guarantee that
creditors break even. Since default would never occur, the priority ranking of derivatives relative
to debt would be irrelevant. If, on the other hand, the firm cannot commit not to take further
derivative positions, the priority ranking of the derivative relative to debt still matters. The reason
is that, under no commitment, senior derivatives allow the firm to ex post undo the state-contingent
contract agreed to at date 0, leading to the same inefficiency as in Proposition 7.
35This point is related to the beneficial role that ex post dilution can have in mitigating debt
overhang (see, e.g., Stulz and Johnson (1985) and Diamond (1993b)).
36Note, however, that this situation arises in a region where hedging is less valuable in the first
place, because C2 is relatively small: C2 ∈ (C˜2, C¯2).
37The strategic default condition (56) assumes that the firm can extract no surplus through
renegotiation after a strategic default. This is the case if the creditor can commit not to renegotiate
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with the debtor and always liquidates the firm after a strategic default. If, on the other hand, the
creditor cannot commit not to renegotiate, then the firm can usually extract positive surplus S > 0
in renegotiation. In this case, the firm defaults strategically if R (x) + x (x) > CL1 + C2 − S. The
assumption that the lender can commit not to renegotiate is not crucial for our analysis. A sketch
of the analysis with renegotiation after a strategic default is provided in Appendix B of the NBER
working paper version of this paper (NPER WP 17599).
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Internet Appendix to
“Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?”∗
A. Omitted Derivations of Results in Section 6
This section contains a detailed discussion of the results presented in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of
the paper: the priority ranking in the presence of cross-netting when (i) basis risk and cash flow
risk are systematic and (ii) basis risk and cash flow risk are idiosyncratic.
Basis Risk and Cash Flow Risk Are Systematic: Consider first the case in which both
cash flow risk and basis risk are systematic. In this case, when the representative counterparty
observes the signal sH , it learns that all derivatives it has written will move against it, such that a
significant liability is added to its balance sheet. To preserve the counterparty’s incentives, it now
must post collateral in a margin account, which leads to deadweight costs.
When derivatives are senior, the counterparty incurs an aggregate liability ofXS if all derivatives
simultaneously move against it (Z = ZH). In this case, which occurs with probability 1 − θ, the
counterparty has to post an amount
ζS =
XS −AP
Γ− P (IA.1)
as collateral. When the derivative moves in favor of the counterparty, no collateral has to be posted.
As a result, the ex ante zero-profit condition for the counterparty is given by
θxS − (1− θ)XS − (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζS = 0, (IA.2)
where the term (1− θ) (1− Γ) ζS reflects the expected deadweight cost of collateral that the coun-
terparty is required to post when derivatives are senior.
Now consider the junior derivatives. When Z = ZH , the counterparty receives the payment xJ
only if all firms obtain the high cash flow CH1 (i.e., payment to the counterparty depends on the
realization of the aggregate basis risk). Hence, the counterparty receives xJ only with probability
∗Citation format: Patrick Bolton and Martin Oehmke, [year], Internet Appendix to “Should Derivatives Be
Privileged in Bankruptcy?,” Journal of Finance [vol #], [pages], http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp. Please
note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by
the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the article.
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[θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]. When Z = ZL, the counterparty incurs an aggregate liability of XJ and it
must therefore post an amount
ζJ =
XJ −AP
Γ− P (IA.3)
of collateral. The ex ante zero-profit condition for the counterparty is then given by
[θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xJ − (1− θ)XJ − (1− θ) (Γ− 1) ζJ = 0. (IA.4)
Again, the term (1− θ) (Γ− 1) ζS reflects the expected deadweight cost of collateral.
Not surprisingly, in this case the comparison of the junior and senior derivative regimes is
analogous to the partial equilibrium analysis in the preceding section. Because RJ > RS , the
required notional derivative position is higher under senior derivatives than under junior derivatives:
XS > XJ . This leads to a higher aggregate net liability for the counterparty, such that the
required collateral is higher under senior derivatives than junior derivatives, ζS > ζJ . This leads
to higher deadweight costs under senior derivatives. Essentially, when cash flow risk and basis risk
are perfectly correlated across firms, seniority for derivatives does not generate any diversification
benefits for the derivative counterparty. Hence, the only relevant efficiency consideration is to lower
the size of the required derivative positions, which is achieved by making derivatives junior to debt
in bankruptcy.
Basis Risk and Cash Flow Risk Are Idiosyncratic: Suppose now that both cash flow risk
and basis risk are idiosyncratic. Then the payoff to the representative derivative counterparty is
deterministic. By the law of large numbers, a fraction θ of the counterparty’s derivative contract
moves in favor of the counterparty (Z = ZH), while a fraction 1− θ moves out of favor (Z = ZL).
When derivatives are senior to debt, the balance sheet of the representative counterparty is thereby
given by
A+ θxS − (1− θ)XS , (IA.5)
assuming that the counterparty is not required to post collateral, which we verify below. Given
that the counterparty cannot make strictly positive profits in equilibrium, the following zero-profit
condition must hold:
A+ θxS − (1− θ)XS = A. (IA.6)
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The counterparty thus sets xS such that θxS − (1− θ)XS = 0. Because its balance sheet is
deterministic, the counterparty never has a net liability, which implies that the counterparty’s
incentive constraint is always satisfied and no collateral has to be posted (ζS = 0).
An analogous argument applies when derivatives are junior to debt. In this case, the balance
sheet of the counterparty (again assuming that no collateral has to be posted) is given by
A+ [θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xJ − (1− θ)XJ , (IA.7)
taking into account that the counterparty receives no payment from firms that receive CL1 and owe
xS to the counterparty. The counterparty’s zero-profit condition thus becomes
A+ [θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xJ − (1− θ)XJ = A. (IA.8)
The counterparty thus sets xJ such that [θ − (1− θ) (1− γ)]xJ − (1− θ)XJ = 0. Also in this case,
because its balance sheet is deterministic, the counterparty never has a net liability, which implies
that the counterparty’s incentive constraint is always satisfied and no collateral has to be posted
(ζJ = 0).
Because ζS = ζJ = 0, no deadweight costs arise for the counterparty, irrespective of the relative
priority of debt and derivative contracts. Hence, while the pricing of the derivative contract differs
depending on the bankruptcy regime (equations (IA.6) and (IA.8)), the relative priority ranking of
debt and derivatives does not affect aggregate surplus.
B. Robustness
To keep the analysis tractable we have considered the most stripped-down setting possible, with
only two periods and two possible cash flow realizations at date 1. However, the main qualitative
results hold in much more general settings.
Note first that it is not essential to restrict the number of possible cash flow outcomes to only
two. As shown by Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Raith and Povel (2004), when the firm’s cash flow at
date 1 is drawn from a continuum of possible realizations, C1 ∈ [0, C¯1], with a probability density
function h(C1), then the optimal financial contract also takes the form of a debt contract and has
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the following features. The firm can continue operating until date 2 if it repays the promised debt
amount B ≤ C2 at date 1. If the firm repays an amount ρ < B, then it can continue to operate
only with probability
λ(ρ) = 1− B − ρ
C2
. (IA.9)
This contract gives the firm an incentive to repay as much as it can (ρ = C1) at date 1 whenever
its cash flow realization falls short of its total obligation B. Note that this contract has the same
general properties as the contract we derived in the case of two cash flow outcomes: It leads
to efficient continuation in all cash flow states C1 ≥ B, and it results in inefficient liquidation
(with positive probability) in all cash flow states C1 < B. Moreover, the probability of inefficient
liquidation increases in the repayment shortfall (B−C1). This result continues to hold when C2 is
also random (for details, see Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Raith and Povel (2004)).
As in the setting with only two possible cash flow realizations, it is straightforward to see that
a derivative contract specifying payments contingent on a random variable Z that is negatively
correlated with C1 can improve on the outcome without derivatives. Consider, for example, the case
in which Z is continuously distributed on the support [Z,Z] and is perfectly negatively correlated
with C1, such that there is no basis risk. With a slight abuse of notation, let the support [Z,Z] be
the same as the support of cash flows [0, C¯1]. Then a derivative contract such that X(C1) = B−C1
for all C1 < B and X(C1) = −α(C1 − B) for all C1 ≥ B (with α ∈ (0, 1)) would provide perfect
insurance to the firm as in the setting with only two possible cash flow realizations. To break even,
the counterparty would set α such that
α
∫ C¯1
B
(C1 −B)dH(C1) =
∫ B
0
(B − C1)dH(C1). (IA.10)
In the presence of basis risk, the same general trade-off and qualitative result on the optimal
priority ranking of debt and derivatives would obtain as in the case with two cash flow realizations,
although the mathematical analysis would be considerably more involved. In particular, when the
derivative counterparty and creditor have competing claims in a low-cash flow state (C1 < B), then
the effect of giving seniority to the derivative contract is to raise the promised debt repayment B
and therefore the firm’s demand for insurance via the derivative. As in the model with only two
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possible cash-flows, this raises the deadweight cost of hedging by increasing collateral requirements
for the derivative counterparty.
Another simplification in our model is that the firm has a single investment of fixed size F .
Our analysis can be extended to a situation where cash flows are an increasing concave function of
initial variable investment I: {CL1 (I), CH1 (I), C2(I)}. In this more general setting, there would be
an additional cost of giving priority to derivatives over debt: By raising the cost of funding for the
firm, it would also result in lower investment. Similarly, the model can be extended to introduce
corporate taxes and a tax-shield benefit of debt, as is shown in Appendix B of the NBER working
paper version of this article (NPER WP 17599). When the firm can obtain a tax-shield benefit of
debt it will generally issue more debt claims than it needs in order to finance the setup cost F .
One may then wonder whether having senior derivatives may actually not be a benefit to the firm,
as the higher promised debt repayment it would entail would provide the firm with a higher tax
shield. We show, however, that this benefit is always outweighed by the higher deadweight cost of
hedging.
Finally, the analysis can be generalized to allow for costly outside equity financing. In our
framework, the costs of outside equity could, for example, be auditing costs that arise when verifying
realized cash flows. In this more general model, the firm may choose equity financing over debt
financing if bankruptcy costs are too high. The costs of giving derivatives seniority over debt then
no longer come only in the form of higher deadweight costs of hedging, but also from pushing the
firm toward costly equity financing. The privileged bankruptcy treatment of derivatives would still
be inefficient; only the specific form of the costly distortion would change.
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